Gustafsson, Carl Johan Eric orcid.org/0000-0002-9618-577X (2018) The Unimportance of Being Any Future Person. Philosophical Studies. pp. 745-750. ISSN 0031-8116
Abstract
Derek Parfit’s argument against the platitude that identity is what matters in survival does not work given his intended reading of the platitude, namely, that what matters in survival to some future time is being identical with someone who is alive at that time. I develop Parfit’s argument so that it works against the platitude on the intended reading.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © The Author(s) 2017. |
Keywords: | Division,Fission,Indeterminacy,Personal identity,Survival,What matters |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of York |
Academic Units: | The University of York > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (York) > Philosophy (York) |
Depositing User: | Pure (York) |
Date Deposited: | 12 Apr 2017 09:40 |
Last Modified: | 16 Oct 2024 13:41 |
Published Version: | https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-0890-9 |
Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1007/s11098-017-0890-9 |
Related URLs: | |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:114987 |
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Description: The unimportance of being any future person
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