Cochrane, T. (2017) The Double Intentionality of Emotional Experience. European Journal of Philosophy. ISSN 0966-8373
Abstract
© 2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.I argue that while the feeling of bodily responses is not necessary to emotion, these feelings contribute significant meaningful content to everyday emotional experience. Emotional bodily feelings represent a 'state of self', analysed as a sense of one's body affording certain patterns of interaction with the environment. Recognising that there are two sources of intentional content in everyday emotional experience allows us to reconcile the diverging intuitions that people have about emotional states, and to understand better the long-standing debate between bodily feeling-based and appraisal-based theories of emotion.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. This is an author produced version of a paper subsequently published in European Journal of Philosophy. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (Sheffield) > Department of Philosophy (Sheffield) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Sheffield |
Date Deposited: | 27 Mar 2017 14:44 |
Last Modified: | 02 Mar 2019 01:38 |
Published Version: | https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12233 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Wiley |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1111/ejop.12233 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:114174 |