Faulkner, P. (2014) Really Trying or Merely Trying. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, 41 (3). pp. 363-380. ISSN 0094-8705
Abstract
We enjoy first-person authority with respect to a certain class of actions: for these actions, we know what we are doing just because we are doing it. This paper first formulates an epistemological principle that captures this authority in terms of trying to act in a way that one has the capacity to act. It then considers a case of effortful action – running a middle distance race – that threatens this principle. And proposes the solution of changing the metaphysics of action: one can keep hold of the idea that we have first-person authority over what we are doing by adopting a disjunctive account of action.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
---|---|
Authors/Creators: |
|
Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2013 Taylor & Francis (Routledge). This is an author produced version of a paper subsequently published in Journal of the Philosophy of Sport. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Keywords: | Knowledge; epistemiology; action; metaphysics |
Dates: |
|
Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (Sheffield) > Department of Philosophy (Sheffield) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Sheffield |
Date Deposited: | 15 Feb 2017 15:27 |
Last Modified: | 21 Mar 2018 03:53 |
Published Version: | https://doi.org/10.1080/00948705.2013.858635 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Taylor & Francis (Routledge) |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1080/00948705.2013.858635 |
Related URLs: | |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:112184 |