Holroyd, J. (2017) On Regretting Things I Didn't Do and Couldn't Have Done. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 34 (3). pp. 403-413. ISSN 0264-3758
Abstract
One of the lines of investigation opened up by Wallace in The View from Here concerns the notion of regret: what it is, what it is rationally constrained by, and what are the proper objects of regret. A distinctive feature of Wallace's view is that regret is an intention-like state, which, whilst backward-looking, is bound up with our future directed practices of value. In this commentary, I set out Wallace's claims on regret, its rational constraints, and its objects, and raise some worries about Wallace's position on each of these three issues.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2016, Society for Applied Philosophy. This is an author produced version of a paper subsequently published in Journal of Applied Philosophy. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (Sheffield) > Department of Philosophy (Sheffield) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Sheffield |
Date Deposited: | 20 Jan 2017 13:18 |
Last Modified: | 30 Oct 2018 01:38 |
Published Version: | https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12246 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Wiley |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1111/japp.12246 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:110855 |