Collins, S. and Lawford-Smith, H. (2015) Collectives' and individuals' obligations: a parity argument. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 46 (1). pp. 38-58. ISSN 0045-5091
Abstract
Individuals have various kinds of obligations: keep promises, don’t cause harm, return benefits received from injustices, be partial to loved ones, help the needy and so on. How does this work for group agents? There are two questions here. The first is whether groups can bear the same kinds of obligations as individuals. The second is whether groups’ pro tanto obligations plug into what they all-things-considered ought to do to the same degree that individuals’ pro tanto obligations plug into what they all-things-considered ought to do. We argue for parity on both counts.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2015 Canadian Journal of Philosophy. This is an author produced version of a paper subsequently published in Canadian Journal of Philosophy. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Keywords: | Collective obligation; collective responsibility; individual obligation; group agency; demandingness; promises; wrongdoing; benefit; beneficence; associative obligation |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (Sheffield) > Department of Philosophy (Sheffield) |
Funding Information: | Funder Grant number EUROPEAN COMMISSION - FP6/FP7 618516 |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Sheffield |
Date Deposited: | 30 Nov 2016 10:25 |
Last Modified: | 19 Jul 2017 22:48 |
Published Version: | https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2015.1116350 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Taylor & Francis |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1080/00455091.2015.1116350 |
Related URLs: | |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:108565 |