Roberts, Pendaran, Allen, Keith Malcolm orcid.org/0000-0002-3219-2102 and Schmidtke, Kelly (2017) Folk intuitions about the causal theory of perception. Ergo. ISSN 2330-4014
Abstract
It is widely held by philosophers not only that is there a causal condition on perception but also that the causal condition is a conceptual truth about perception. One influential line of argument for this claim is based on intuitive responses to a style of thought experiment popularized by Grice. Given the significance of these thought experiments to the literature, it is important to see whether the folk in fact respond to these cases in the way that philosophers assume they should. We test folk intuitions regarding the causal theory of perception by asking our participants to what extent they agree that they would ‘see’ an object in various Gricean scenarios. We find that the intuitions of the folk do not strongly support the causal condition; they at most strongly support a ‘no blocker’ condition. We argue that this is problematic for the claim that the causal condition is a conceptual truth.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
---|---|
Authors/Creators: |
|
Keywords: | Perception,Experimental Philosophy,Causal theory of perception |
Dates: |
|
Institution: | The University of York |
Academic Units: | The University of York > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (York) > Philosophy (York) |
Depositing User: | Pure (York) |
Date Deposited: | 19 Oct 2016 08:21 |
Last Modified: | 25 Mar 2025 00:07 |
Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:105714 |
Download
Filename: Folk_intuitions_about_the_causal_theory_of_perception_Ergo_final_version_for_proofing_.docx
Description: Folk intuitions about the causal theory of perception (Ergo, final version for proofing)
Licence: CC-BY-NC-ND 2.5