Gould, M. and Rablen, M.D. orcid.org/0000-0002-3521-096X (2016) Equitable representation in councils: theory and an application to the United Nations Security Council. Public Choice, 169 (1). pp. 19-51. ISSN 0048-5829
Abstract
We analyze democratic equity in council voting games (CVGs). In a CVG, a voting body containing all members delegates decisionmaking to a (time-varying) subset of its members, as describes, e.g., the relationship between the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). We develop a theoretical framework for analyzing democratic equitability in CVGs at both the country and region levels, and for different assumptions regarding preference correlation. We apply the framework to evaluate the equitability of the UNSC, and the claims of those who seek to reform it. We find that the individual permanent members are overrepresented by between 21.3 times (United Kingdom) and 3.8 times (China) from a country-level perspective, while from a region perspective Eastern Europe is the most heavily overrepresented region with more than twice its equitable representation, and Africa the most heavily under-represented. Our equity measures do not preclude some UNSC members from exercising veto rights, however.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © The Author(s) 2016. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Social Sciences (Sheffield) > Department of Economics (Sheffield) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Sheffield |
Date Deposited: | 08 Sep 2016 13:35 |
Last Modified: | 29 Oct 2018 11:14 |
Published Version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-016-0368-x |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Springer Verlag |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1007/s11127-016-0368-x |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:104341 |