Gregory, D.I. (2017) Counterfactual reasoning and knowledge of possibilities. Philosophical Studies, 174 (4). pp. 821-835. ISSN 0031-8116
Abstract
Williamson has argued against scepticism concerning our metaphysically modal knowledge, by arguing that standard patterns of suppositional reasoning to counterfactual conclusions provide reliable sources of correct ascriptions of possibility and necessity. The paper argues that, while Williamson’s claims relating to necessity may well be right, he has not provided adequate reasons for thinking that the familiar modes of counterfactual reasoning to which he points generalise to provide a decent route to ascriptions of possibility. The paper also explores another path to ascriptions of possibility that may be extracted from Williamson’s ideas, before briefly considering the general status of counterfactual reasoning in relation to our knowledge of possibilities.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © The Author(s) 2016. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com |
Keywords: | Modal epistemology; Possibility; Counterfactuals; Suppositions; Knowledge; Williamson |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (Sheffield) > Department of Philosophy (Sheffield) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Sheffield |
Date Deposited: | 11 Aug 2016 10:57 |
Last Modified: | 25 Oct 2018 13:34 |
Published Version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0707-2 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Springer Verlag |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1007/s11098-016-0707-2 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:103547 |