Excessive Leverage and Bankers’ Pay: Governance and Financial Stability Costs of a Symbiotic Relationship

Avgouleas, E. and Cullen, J. (2015) Excessive Leverage and Bankers’ Pay: Governance and Financial Stability Costs of a Symbiotic Relationship. The Columbia Journal of European Law, 21 (1). ISSN 1076-6715

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Metadata

Authors/Creators:
  • Avgouleas, E.
  • Cullen, J.
Dates:
  • Published: 8 January 2015
Institution: The University of Sheffield
Academic Units: The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Social Sciences (Sheffield) > Department of Law (Sheffield)
Depositing User: Symplectic Sheffield
Date Deposited: 15 Dec 2015 16:20
Last Modified: 15 Dec 2015 16:20
Published Version: http://cjel.law.columbia.edu/
Status: Published
Publisher: Transnational Juris Publications
Refereed: Yes

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