CEO inside debt holdings and risk-shifting: Evidence from bank payout policies

Srivastav, A, Armitage, S and Hagendorff, J (2014) CEO inside debt holdings and risk-shifting: Evidence from bank payout policies. Journal of Banking and Finance, 47 (1). 41 - 53. ISSN 0378-4266

Abstract

Metadata

Authors/Creators:
  • Srivastav, A
  • Armitage, S
  • Hagendorff, J
Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: (c) 2014, Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. This is an author produced version of a paper published in Journal of Banking & Finance. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy.
Keywords: Banks; Inside debt; CEO incentives; Payout; Dividends
Dates:
  • Accepted: 17 June 2014
  • Published: 26 June 2014
Institution: The University of Leeds
Academic Units: The University of Leeds > Faculty of Business (Leeds) > Accounting & Finance Division (LUBS) (Leeds)
Depositing User: Symplectic Publications
Date Deposited: 12 Aug 2015 15:19
Last Modified: 08 Feb 2017 12:17
Published Version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.06.016
Status: Published
Publisher: Elsevier
Identification Number: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.06.016

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