Darwall on Second-Personal Ethics

Stephen Darwall is rightly regarded as one of the most interesting ethicists writing today. In his 2006 book The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect and Accountability (Darwall 2006), he introduced into the debate a new emphasis on what he called the second-personal character of ethics, which he defended with skill and care. In the newer books under review,1 which are collections of papers most of which were published previously, he expands and elaborates the position taken in his monograph. This includes engaging in debates with critics and opponents; following through various implications of his position in new ways; and adding depth and detail to some of the historical background of his view. Taken together, then, these three works represent a formidable articulation of a distinctive position in ethics, which is bound to continue to attract discussion and controversy. In what follows, I will begin by offering a brief sketch of Darwall’s basic outlook (§1), offer an overview of the themes of the papers in these collections (§2), and then present some critical responses of my own (§3).