Sense‐making and hermeneutical injustice following a psychiatric diagnosis

When one is seriously ill, the diagnosis given can generate questions about what it means and how to make sense of it. This is particularly the case for psychiatric diagnoses which can convey a biomedical narrative of the sufferer's condition. Making sense of one's diagnosis in such cases can involve changing one's self-narrative in such a way as to incorporate the belief that one has developed a disease with an unknown cause. To demonstrate the importance of self-narratives, I outline key themes in narrative theory which have been explored in various ways by philosophers and some psychologists. These theorists emphasise the importance of self-narratives in creating meaning for their authors. The biomedical narrative associated with a psychiatric diagnosis may conflict with the recipient's previous self-narratives. This may reduce the recipient's sense of self-efficacy and induce feelings of hopelessness about recovery. I argue that those receiving a psychiatric diagnosis may consequently be vulnerable to epistemic injustice. In particular, this includes hermeneutical injustice, where individuals lack the ability to understand or articulate their experiences in ways that make sense to them, due to their hermeneutical resources being marginalised by the dominant narrative in a medicalized environment. I consider two possible objections to my claim and offer answers to these.