Sidestepping the Frege–Geach Problem

Hybrid expressivists claim to solve the Frege–Geach problem by offloading the explanation of the logico-semantic properties of moral sentences onto the belief-components of hybrid states they express. We argue that this strategy is undermined by one of hybrid expressivism's own commitments: That the truth of the belief-component is neither necessary nor sufficient for the truth of the hybrid state it composes. We articulate a new approach. Instead of explaining head-on what it is for, say, a pair of moral sentences to be inconsistent, expressivists should ‘sidestep’ and explain what it is to think that a pair of moral sentences is inconsistent. To think so is to think they cannot both be true—a modal notion. Since expressivists have given accounts of such modals, we illustrate how sentences like ‘‘‘lying is wrong’’ and ‘‘lying is not wrong’’ are inconsistent’ express sensible—and rationally compelling—states of mind.