Goetze, T.S. orcid.org/0000-0002-3435-3264 (2021) Moral entanglement : taking responsibility and vicarious responsibility. The Monist, 104 (2). pp. 210-223. ISSN 0026-9662
Abstract
Vicarious responsibility is sometimes analysed by considering the different kinds of agents involved—who is vicariously responsible for the actions of whom? In this paper, I discuss vicarious responsibility from a different angle: in what sense is the vicarious agent responsible? I do this by considering the ways in which one may take responsibility for events caused by another agent or process. I discuss three senses of taking responsibility—accepting fault, assuming obligations, and fulfilling obligations—and the forms of vicarious responsibility that correspond to these. I end by explaining how to judge which sense applies in a given case, based on the degree of (what I call) moral entanglement between the agent and what they should take responsibility for.
Metadata
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2021 The Author. This is an author-produced version of a paper subsequently published in The Monist. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. | ||||
Keywords: | philosophy; ethics; responsibility; moral luck; vicarious responsibility | ||||
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Institution: | The University of Sheffield | ||||
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (Sheffield) > Department of Philosophy (Sheffield) | ||||
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Depositing User: | Symplectic Sheffield | ||||
Date Deposited: | 18 Mar 2021 07:57 | ||||
Last Modified: | 11 Mar 2023 01:13 | ||||
Status: | Published | ||||
Publisher: | Oxford University Press (OUP) | ||||
Refereed: | Yes | ||||
Identification Number: | https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onaa033 |