Tournament incentives, age diversity and firm performance

Talavera, O., Yin, S. and Zhang, M. (2021) Tournament incentives, age diversity and firm performance. Journal of Empirical Finance, 61. pp. 139-162. ISSN 0927-5398

Abstract

Metadata

Authors/Creators:
  • Talavera, O.
  • Yin, S.
  • Zhang, M.
Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: © 2021 Elsevier B.V. This is an author produced version of a paper subsequently published in Journal of Empirical Finance. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. Article available under the terms of the CC-BY-NC-ND licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Keywords: Executive compensation; Tournament effect; Non-CEO executives; Age diversity; Seniority
Dates:
  • Accepted: 6 January 2021
  • Published (online): 21 January 2021
  • Published: March 2021
Institution: The University of Sheffield
Academic Units: The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Social Sciences (Sheffield) > Sheffield University Management School
Depositing User: Symplectic Sheffield
Date Deposited: 29 Jan 2021 11:03
Last Modified: 21 Jul 2022 00:13
Status: Published
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Refereed: Yes
Identification Number: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jempfin.2021.01.003

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