Vulnerability, trust, and overdemandingness: reflections from Løgstrup

My aim in this paper is to consider whether, by thinking of our ethical relation to one another in terms of vulnerability, we can better resolve the problem of overdemandingness – namely, that certain moral views and theories seem to require more of us than is reasonably acceptable. I will suggest that there is a way in which focusing on vulnerability, rather than merely needs or wants, can help address the issue of overdemandingness, largely because of the relational nature of vulnerability, and how this connects to our power over others. In arguing this case, I will draw on the work of the Danish philosopher and theologian K. E. Løgstrup. I explore how Løgstrup shows how this might work in relation to a central form of vulnerability which he emphasises, namely trust. I then consider an objection, namely that trust is a rather special case of vulnerability, which is less open to the problem of overdemandingness only because it has particular features which do not apply to vulnerability more generally. I then respond to this objection by considering if lessons learnt from the case of trust could still nonetheless be extended more widely to other forms of vulnerability. Doing so, I will suggest, might show how thinking in terms of vulnerability as Løgstrup conceives it can help us with the problem of overdemandingness