Optimal insurance under adverse selection and ambiguity aversion

Koufopoulos, Konstantinos and Kozhan, Roman (2016) Optimal insurance under adverse selection and ambiguity aversion. Economic theory. 659–687. ISSN 0938-2259



  • Koufopoulos, Konstantinos (kostas.koufopoulos@york.ac.uk)
  • Kozhan, Roman
Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015. This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. Further copying may not be permitted; contact the publisher for details.
Keywords: Adverse selection, Ambiguity aversion, Endogenous commitment
  • Accepted: 8 October 2015
  • Published (online): 19 October 2015
  • Published: 1 October 2016
Institution: The University of York
Academic Units: The University of York > Faculty of Social Sciences (York) > Economics and Related Studies (York)
Depositing User: Pure (York)
Date Deposited: 21 Aug 2019 12:30
Last Modified: 06 Dec 2023 13:16
Published Version: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0926-3
Status: Published
Refereed: Yes
Identification Number: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0926-3
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Filename: Optimal_Insurance_under_Adverse_Selection_and_Ambiguity_Aversion_ET_22_10_2015_.pdf

Description: Optimal Insurance under Adverse Selection and Ambiguity Aversion (ET, 22-10-2015)