Decoupling management inefficiency: Myopia, hyperopia and takeover likelihood

Tunyi, A. orcid.org/0000-0002-5761-931X, Ntim, C. and Danbolt, J. (2019) Decoupling management inefficiency: Myopia, hyperopia and takeover likelihood. International Review of Financial Analysis, 62. pp. 1-20. ISSN 1057-5219

Abstract

Metadata

Authors/Creators:
Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: © 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/BY/4.0/).
Keywords: Hyperopia; Inefficient management hypothesis; Management performance; Myopia; Takeovers
Dates:
  • Accepted: 7 January 2019
  • Published (online): 10 January 2019
  • Published: March 2019
Institution: The University of Sheffield
Academic Units: The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Social Sciences (Sheffield) > Sheffield University Management School
Depositing User: Symplectic Sheffield
Date Deposited: 21 Jan 2019 09:36
Last Modified: 25 Nov 2021 09:20
Status: Published
Publisher: Elsevier
Refereed: Yes
Identification Number: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2019.01.004

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