Entry deterrence by timing rather than overinvestment in a strategic real options framework

Huberts, Nick Fijbo Dick, Dawid, Herbert, Huisman, Kuno J.M. et al. (1 more author) (2019) Entry deterrence by timing rather than overinvestment in a strategic real options framework. European Journal of Operational Research. pp. 165-185. ISSN 0377-2217

Abstract

Metadata

Authors/Creators:
  • Huberts, Nick Fijbo Dick (nick.huberts@york.ac.uk)
  • Dawid, Herbert
  • Huisman, Kuno J.M.
  • Kort, Peter
Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: © 2018 Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy.
Keywords: Game Theory,Incumbent/Entrant,Capacity choice,Investment under Uncertainty,Real Option Games,Real-option games,Investment under uncertainty,Game theory,Economics and Econometrics,Management Science and Operations Research,Information Systems and Management,Computer Science,Modelling and Simulation
Dates:
  • Accepted: 31 August 2018
  • Published (online): 7 September 2018
  • Published: 1 April 2019
Institution: The University of York
Academic Units: The University of York > Faculty of Social Sciences (York) > The York Management School
Depositing User: Pure (York)
Date Deposited: 26 Nov 2018 10:20
Last Modified: 12 Jan 2022 00:53
Published Version: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2018.08.049
Status: Published
Refereed: Yes
Identification Number: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2018.08.049
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Description: Entry deterrence by timing rather than overinvestment in a strategic real options framework

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