A Signaling-based Incentive Mechanism for Device-to-Device Content Sharing in Cellular Networks

Abstract

In this letter, we model the Device-to-device (D2D) content sharing problem as a labor market where the base station (BS) acts as the principal and content providers serve as agents. A signaling-based content-sharing incentive (SCSI) mechanism is designed to encourage candidate content providers to participate in content sharing, and the optimal strategy for each content provider is derived to maximize their utility (monetary profit) while guaranteeing a non-negative utility for the BS. Simulation results show that the proposed SCSI mechanism can increase the content provider’s utility and participating enthusiasm in D2D content sharing.

Metadata

Authors/Creators:

Zhang, T.
Wang, H.
Chu, X. https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1863-6149
He, J.

Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information:

© 2017 IEEE. This is an author produced version of a paper subsequently published in IEEE Communications Letters. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy.

Keywords:

content sharing; device-to-device communications; signaling; incentive mechanism

Dates:

Accepted: 7 February 2017
Published (online): 14 February 2017
Published: June 2017

Institution:

The University of Sheffield

Academic Units:

The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Engineering (Sheffield) > Department of Electronic and Electrical Engineering (Sheffield)

Funding Information:

Funder	Grant number
EUROPEAN COMMISSION - HORIZON 2020	645705 - DECADE

Depositing User:

Symplectic Sheffield

Date Deposited:

09 Feb 2017 16:41

Last Modified:

18 Jul 2017 03:52

Published Version:

https://doi.org/10.1109/LCOMM.2017.2669179

Status:

Published

Publisher:

Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)

Refereed:

Yes

Identification Number:

https://doi.org/10.1109/LCOMM.2017.2669179

CORE (COnnecting REpositories)

CORE (COnnecting REpositories)