Power List Reform: A New Constraint Mechanism for Administrative Powers in China

The Commission Office for Public Sector Reform (COPSR) is currently carrying out a series of administrative reforms to improve transparency and accountability in China. The COPSR is responsible for the rationalisation and codification of administrative powers, contributing to what we call “power list” reforms that are being implemented across China. One of the key objectives of these reforms is to weed out redundant powers that hinder the marketisation of the Chinese economy and keep the public guessing as to the limits of local state power. Based on evidence from interviews and focus groups in five provinces we find that the main factors influencing power list reforms are central policy design, political constraints and local agency. We conclude that the tensions arising from the reform process are the result of loosely enforced listing standards, resistance to change from those who profit under the pre-reform system, and a lack of effective legal guarantees that hinders power list reforms. The evidence presented in this article contributes to broader debates about authoritarian resilience based on the CCP’s efforts to govern better and improve relations with society.