Repeated games over networks with vector payoffs: the notion of attainability.
Lehrer, E., Solan, E. and Bauso, D.
(2011)
Repeated games over networks with vector payoffs: the notion of attainability.
In:
NetGCoop.
2011 5th International Conference on Network Games, Control and Optimization (NetGCooP), 12-14 Oct 2011, Paris, France.
IEEE
, 1 - 5.
ISBN 978-1-4673-0383-5
Abstract
We introduce the concept of strongly attainable sets
of payoffs in two-player repeated games with vector payoffs in continuous time. A set of payoffs is called strongly attainable if player 1 has a strategy guaranteeing, even in the worst case, that the distance between the set and the cumulative payoff shrinks with time to zero. We characterize when any vector is strongly attainable and illustrate the motivation of our study on a multiinventory
application.
CORE (COnnecting REpositories)
CORE (COnnecting REpositories)