French, S.R.D. (2003) A model-theoretic account of representation (or, I don't know much about art … but I know it involves isomorphism). Philosophy of Science, 70 (5). pp. 1472-1483. ISSN 0031-8248
Available under licence : See the attached licence file.
Discussions of representation in science tend to draw on examples from art. However, such examples need to be handled with care given a) the differences between works of art and scientific theories and b) the accommodation of these examples within certain philosophies of art. I shall examine the claim that isomorphism is neither necessary nor sufficient for representation and I shall argue that there exist accounts of representation in both art and science involving isomorphism which accommodate the apparent counterexamples and, moreover, allow us to understand how ‘‘impossible’’ artistic objects and inconsistent scientific theories can be said to represent.
|Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information:||© 2003 University of Chicago Press. Reproduced in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy.|
|Institution:||The University of Leeds|
|Academic Units:||The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts (Leeds) > School of Humanities (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds) > Division of the History and Philosophy of Science (Leeds)
The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds) > Division of the History and Philosophy of Science (Leeds)
|Depositing User:||Leeds Philosophy Department|
|Date Deposited:||10 Oct 2007 11:32|
|Last Modified:||08 Feb 2013 17:04|
|Publisher:||University of Chicago Press|