Is There a Good Moral Argument Against Moral Realism?

Golub, C orcid.org/0000-0003-3934-5842 (2020) Is There a Good Moral Argument Against Moral Realism? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. ISSN 1386-2820

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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: © The Author(s) 2020. This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
Keywords: Moral realism . Moral arguments. Robust realism . Minimal realism
Dates:
  • Accepted: 9 October 2020
  • Published (online): 13 October 2020
Institution: The University of Leeds
Academic Units: The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds)
Funding Information:
FunderGrant number
EU - European Union837036
Depositing User: Symplectic Publications
Date Deposited: 12 Oct 2020 14:14
Last Modified: 07 Dec 2020 20:37
Status: Published online
Publisher: Springer
Identification Number: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-020-10129-5

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