(Neutrally) Optimal Mechanism under Adverse Selection: The canonical insurance problem

Koufopoulos, Konstantinos and Diasakos, Theodoros (2018) (Neutrally) Optimal Mechanism under Adverse Selection: The canonical insurance problem. Games and Economic Behaviour. 159–186. ISSN 0899-8256

Abstract

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Authors/Creators:
  • Koufopoulos, Konstantinos (kostas.koufopoulos@york.ac.uk)
  • Diasakos, Theodoros
Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: ©2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. Further copying may not be permitted; contact the publisher for details.
Keywords: Insurance market,Adverse selection,Interim incentive efficiency,Neutral optimum
Dates:
  • Published: September 2018
Institution: The University of York
Academic Units: The University of York > Faculty of Social Sciences (York) > Economics and Related Studies (York)
Depositing User: Pure (York)
Date Deposited: 21 Aug 2019 12:50
Last Modified: 19 May 2020 23:26
Published Version: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.04.007
Status: Published
Refereed: Yes
Identification Number: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.04.007

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Description: Neutrally Optimal Mechanism under Adverse Selection (Accepted Version)

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