A Counterexample to Three Imprecise Decision Theories

Bradley, S orcid.org/0000-0001-9663-7919 (2019) A Counterexample to Three Imprecise Decision Theories. Theoria, 85 (1). pp. 18-30. ISSN 0040-5825

Abstract

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Authors/Creators:
Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: © 2018 Stiftelsen Theoria. This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Bradley, S (2018) A Counterexample to Three Imprecise Decision Theories. Theoria. ISSN 0040-5825, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12170. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions.
Keywords: decision theory; formal epistemology; imprecise probability
Dates:
  • Published: 11 February 2019
  • Accepted: 28 August 2018
  • Published (online): 27 November 2018
Institution: The University of Leeds
Academic Units: The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds)
Funding Information:
FunderGrant number
EU - European Union792292
Depositing User: Symplectic Publications
Date Deposited: 20 Sep 2018 16:02
Last Modified: 15 Feb 2019 12:07
Status: Published
Publisher: Wiley
Identification Number: https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12170

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Embargoed until: 27 November 2019

Filename: counterexample.pdf

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