Practical grounds for belief: Kant and James on religion

Abstract

Both Kant and James claim to limit the role of knowledge in order to make room for faith. In this paper, we argue that despite some similarities, their attempts to do this come apart. Our main claim is that, although both Kant and James justify our adopting religious beliefs on practical grounds, James believes that we can—and should—subsequently assess such beliefs on the basis of evidence. We offer our own account of this evidence and discuss what this difference means for their accounts of religious belief.

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Item Type:	Article
Authors/Creators:	Williams, NW https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3478-1864 Saunders, J https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1290-275X
Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information:	© 2018 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Williams NW, Saunders J. Practical grounds for belief: Kant and James on religion. Eur J Philos. 2018;1–14. https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12319, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12319. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy.
Dates:	Published: 19 December 2018 Published (online): 25 January 2018 Accepted: 17 November 2017
Institution:	The University of Leeds
Academic Units:	The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > Inter-Disciplinary Ethics Applied (Leeds)
Depositing User:	Symplectic Publications
Date Deposited:	01 Dec 2017 11:47
Last Modified:	25 Jan 2020 01:38
Status:	Published
Publisher:	Wiley
Identification Number:	10.1111/ejop.12319
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID):	oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:124723

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Practical grounds for belief: Kant and James on religion

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