Cariani, F and Santorio, P (2018) Will done Better: Selection Semantics, Future Credence, and Indeterminacy. Mind, 127 (505). pp. 129-165. ISSN 0026-4423
Abstract
Statements about the future are central in everyday conversation and reasoning. How should we understand their meaning? The received view among philosophers treats will as a tense: in ‘Cynthia will pass her exam’, will shifts the reference time forward. Linguists, however, have produced substantial evidence for the view that will is a modal, on a par with must and would. The different accounts are designed to satisfy different theoretical constraints, apparently pulling in opposite directions. We show that these constraints are jointly satisfied by a novel modal account of will. On this account, will is a modal but doesn't work as a quantifier over worlds. Rather, the meaning of will involves a selection function similar to the one used by Stalnaker in his semantics for conditionals. The resulting theory yields a plausible semantics and logic for will and vindicates our intuitive views about the attitudes that rational agents should have towards future-directed contents.
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2017, Cariani and Santorio.. This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Mind following peer review. The version of record: Fabrizio Cariani, Paolo Santorio; Will done Better: Selection Semantics, Future Credence, and Indeterminacy, Mind, Volume 127, Issue 505, 1 January 2018, Pages 129–165, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzw004 is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzw004 | ||||
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Institution: | The University of Leeds | ||||
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds) | ||||
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Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications | ||||
Date Deposited: | 24 Jun 2016 11:41 | ||||
Last Modified: | 27 Feb 2019 01:38 | ||||
Status: | Published | ||||
Publisher: | Oxford University Press | ||||
Identification Number: | https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzw004 |