Random Decentralized Market Processes for Stable Job Matchings with Competitive Salaries

Chen, Bo, Fujishige, Satoru and Yang, Zaifu orcid.org/0000-0002-3265-7109 (2016) Random Decentralized Market Processes for Stable Job Matchings with Competitive Salaries. Journal of Economic Theory. pp. 25-36. ISSN 0022-0531

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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: © 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. Further copying may not be permitted; contact the publisher for details
Keywords: Competitive salary, Decentralized market, Job matching, Random path, Stability
Dates:
  • Accepted: 9 April 2016
  • Published (online): 19 April 2016
  • Published: September 2016
Institution: The University of York
Academic Units: The University of York > Faculty of Social Sciences (York) > Economics and Related Studies (York)
Depositing User: Pure (York)
Date Deposited: 16 May 2016 13:19
Last Modified: 06 Dec 2023 11:19
Published Version: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.04.003
Status: Published
Refereed: Yes
Identification Number: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.04.003
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