Olson, E.T. (2003) Was Jekyll Hyde? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 66 (2). pp. 328-348. ISSN 0031-8205
Full text available as:![[img]](http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/style/images/fileicons/text.png)
|
Text
olsonet7.pdf Download (162Kb) |
Abstract
Many philosophers say that two or more people or thinking beings could share a single human being in a split-personality case, if only the personalities were sufficiently independent and individually well integrated. I argue that this view is incompatible with our being material things, and conclude that there could never be two or more people in a split-personality case. This refutes the view, almost universally held, that facts about mental unity and disunity determine how many people there are. I suggest that the number of human people is simply the number of appropriately endowed human animals.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | Reprinted with permission from the International Phenomenological Society. |
| Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (Sheffield) > Department of Philosophy (Sheffield) |
| Depositing User: | Sherpa Assistant |
| Date Deposited: | 11 Nov 2005 |
| Last Modified: | 08 Feb 2013 16:48 |
| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| URI: | http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/id/eprint/771 |
Actions (login required)
 |
View Item |
