Olson, E.T. (2003) Was Jekyll Hyde? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 66 (2). pp. 328-348. ISSN 0031-8205
Many philosophers say that two or more people or thinking beings could share a single human being in a split-personality case, if only the personalities were sufficiently independent and individually well integrated. I argue that this view is incompatible with our being material things, and conclude that there could never be two or more people in a split-personality case. This refutes the view, almost universally held, that facts about mental unity and disunity determine how many people there are. I suggest that the number of human people is simply the number of appropriately endowed human animals.
|Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information:||Reprinted with permission from the International Phenomenological Society.|
|Institution:||The University of Sheffield|
|Academic Units:||The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (Sheffield) > Department of Philosophy (Sheffield)|
|Depositing User:||Sherpa Assistant|
|Date Deposited:||11 Nov 2005|
|Last Modified:||08 Jun 2014 06:27|