Ju, Y., Borm, P. and Ruys, P. (2007) The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games. Social Choice and Welfare, 28 (4). pp. 685-703. ISSN 0176-1714Full text not available from this repository.
To generalize the standard solution for 2-person TU games into n-person cases, this paper introduces a recursive two-sided negotiation process to establish cooperation between all players. This leads to a new solution concept for cooperative games: the consensus value. An explicit comparison with the Shapley value is provided, also at the axiomatic level. Moreover, a class of possible generalizations of the consensus value is introduced and axiomatized with the Shapley value at one end and the equal surplus solution at the other. Finally, we discuss a non-cooperative mechanism which implements the consensus value.
|Institution:||The University of York|
|Academic Units:||The University of York > Economics and Related Studies (York)|
|Depositing User:||York RAE Import|
|Date Deposited:||12 Feb 2009 15:43|
|Last Modified:||12 Feb 2009 15:43|
|Publisher:||Springer Science + Business Media|