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The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games

Ju, Y., Borm, P. and Ruys, P. (2007) The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games. Social Choice and Welfare, 28 (4). pp. 685-703. ISSN 0176-1714

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Abstract

To generalize the standard solution for 2-person TU games into n-person cases, this paper introduces a recursive two-sided negotiation process to establish cooperation between all players. This leads to a new solution concept for cooperative games: the consensus value. An explicit comparison with the Shapley value is provided, also at the axiomatic level. Moreover, a class of possible generalizations of the consensus value is introduced and axiomatized with the Shapley value at one end and the equal surplus solution at the other. Finally, we discuss a non-cooperative mechanism which implements the consensus value.

Item Type: Article
Institution: The University of York
Academic Units: The University of York > Economics and Related Studies (York)
Depositing User: York RAE Import
Date Deposited: 12 Feb 2009 15:43
Last Modified: 12 Feb 2009 15:43
Published Version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0192-1
Status: Published
Publisher: Springer Science + Business Media
Identification Number: 10.1007/s00355-006-0192-1
URI: http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/id/eprint/7468

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