Rohner, D. and Frey, B.S. (2007) Blood and Ink! The Common-Interest-Game Between Terrorists and the Media. Public Choice, 133 (1-2). pp. 129-145. ISSN 0048-5829Full text not available from this repository.
It has often been pointed out in the literature that a symbiotic relationship exists between terrorist groups and the media. As yet, however, no formal model has been built based on this issue and only very little empirical research has been done in this field. The present contribution builds a simple game theoretic model, focussing on the strategic interactions between terrorists and the media. The model has features of a common-interest-game and results in multiple equilibria. After a discussion of the policy implications of the model, an empirical analysis is performed. Using newspaper coverage, terror incidents and terror fatalities data, it is shown that media attention and terrorism do mutually Granger cause each other, as predicted by the model. Moreover, it is explained why terror attacks tend to be “bloodier” in developing countries than in Europe and the United States.
|Academic Units:||The University of York > Economics and Related Studies (York)|
|Depositing User:||York RAE Import|
|Date Deposited:||17 Feb 2009 10:59|
|Last Modified:||17 Feb 2009 10:59|
|Publisher:||Springer Science + Business Media|
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