Nordhoff, P. (2003) Believe what you want. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 101 (3). pp. 247-266. ISSN 0066-7374Full text not available from this repository.
The Uncontrollability Thesis is that it is metaphysically impossible consciously to believe that p at will. I review the standard ways in which this might be explained. They focus on the aim or purpose of belief being truth. I argue that these don't work. They either explain the aim in a way which makes it implausible that the Uncontrollability Thesis is true, or they fail to justify their claim that beliefs should be understood as aimed at the truth. I further argue that the explanations don't cut deep enough. Making the aim of truth internal to a state does not explain why we can't produce at will states without this feature but sharing these states' motivational role. I put forward a different explanation. I argue that consciousness makes manifest the attraction of the norm of truth. If we are consciously attending to the question of whether p, we cannot help but make a judgement in line with what the evidence gives us grounds for believing true.
|Institution:||The University of York|
|Academic Units:||The University of York > Philosophy (York)|
|Depositing User:||York RAE Import|
|Date Deposited:||20 Feb 2009 12:39|
|Last Modified:||20 Feb 2009 12:39|