Olson, E.T. (2002) The Ontology of Material Objects. Philosophical Books, 43 (4). pp. 292-299. ISSN 0031-8051
[First paragraph] For a long time philosophers thought material objects were unproblematic. Or nearly so. There may have been a problem about what a material object is: a substance, a bundle of tropes, a compound of substratum and universals, a collection of sense-data, or what have you. But once that was settled there were supposed to be no further metaphysical problems about material objects. This illusion has now largely been dispelled. No one can get a Ph.D. in philosophy nowadays without encountering the puzzles of the ship of Theseus, the statue and the lump, the cat and its tail complement', amoebic fission, and others. These problems are especially pressing on the assumption that we ourselves are material objects.
|Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information:||© 2002 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. This is an electronic version of an article published in Philosophical Books: complete citation information for the final version of the paper, as published in the print edition of Philosophical Books, is available on the Blackwell Synergy online delivery service, accessible via the journal's website at www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0031-8051 or www.blackwell-synergy.com|
|Institution:||The University of Sheffield|
|Academic Units:||The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (Sheffield) > Department of Philosophy (Sheffield)|
|Depositing User:||Repository Officer|
|Date Deposited:||07 Oct 2005|
|Last Modified:||06 Jun 2014 14:00|