Olson, E.T. (2004) Animalism and the Corpse Problem. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 82 (2). pp. 265-274. ISSN 0004-8402Full text available as:
The apparent fact that each of us coincides with a thinking animal looks like a strong argument for our being animals (animalism). Some critics, however, claim that this sort of reasoning actually undermines animalism. According to them, the apparent fact that each human animal coincides with a thinking body that is not an animal is an equally strong argument for our not being animals. I argue that the critics' case fails for reasons that do not affect the case for animalism.
|Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information:||This is an author produced version of a paper published in Australasian Journal of Philosophy. This paper has been peer-reviewed but does not include the final publisher proof-corrections or journal pagination.|
|Academic Units:||The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (Sheffield) > Department of Philosophy (Sheffield)|
|Depositing User:||Repository Officer|
|Date Deposited:||07 Oct 2005|
|Last Modified:||08 Feb 2013 16:48|
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