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Coalitional stability with a credibility constraint

Bhattacharya, A. (2002) Coalitional stability with a credibility constraint. Mathematical Social Sciences, 43 (1). pp. 27-44. ISSN 0165-4896

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Following Chwe (1994) we introduce a similar notion of coalitional stability for proper simple games with the additional desirable property that a coalition moves to an outcome stable with respect to this notion only when the outcome is not dominated by another stable outcome. We call a set of outcomes stable with respect to this notion a credibly consistent set. We examine the issue of the existence and non-emptiness of such sets and investigate their relation to some other solution concepts prevalent in the literature concerning coalitional stability.

Item Type: Article
Institution: The University of York
Academic Units: The University of York > Economics and Related Studies (York)
Depositing User: York RAE Import
Date Deposited: 30 Mar 2009 08:34
Last Modified: 30 Mar 2009 08:34
Published Version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0165-4896(01)00078-6
Status: Published
Publisher: Elsevier Science B.V.
Identification Number: 10.1016/S0165-4896(01)00078-6
URI: http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/id/eprint/6988

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