Bhattacharya, A. (2002) Coalitional stability with a credibility constraint. Mathematical Social Sciences, 43 (1). pp. 27-44. ISSN 0165-4896
Following Chwe (1994) we introduce a similar notion of coalitional stability for proper simple games with the additional desirable property that a coalition moves to an outcome stable with respect to this notion only when the outcome is not dominated by another stable outcome. We call a set of outcomes stable with respect to this notion a credibly consistent set. We examine the issue of the existence and non-emptiness of such sets and investigate their relation to some other solution concepts prevalent in the literature concerning coalitional stability.
|Institution:||The University of York|
|Academic Units:||The University of York > Economics and Related Studies (York)|
|Depositing User:||York RAE Import|
|Date Deposited:||30 Mar 2009 08:34|
|Last Modified:||30 Mar 2009 08:34|
|Publisher:||Elsevier Science B.V.|