Datta, B. and Dixon, H. (2003) Free Internet Access and Regulation: A Note. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 159 (3). pp. 594-598. ISSN 0932-4569
We consider the effect of the regulation of telephony on HAAN's  analysis of the economics of free Internet access. Haan considers an unregulated market, and finds that free Internet access is compatible with an efficient outcome and avoids the double marginalization problem. We find that if there is binding price-cap regulation, then free Internet access is never efficient: ISP access charges will be strictly positive. This suggests that either price-cap regulation is nonbinding in the ISP access market, or some other explanation is required.
|Institution:||The University of York|
|Academic Units:||The University of York > Economics and Related Studies (York)|
|Depositing User:||York RAE Import|
|Date Deposited:||20 Apr 2009 09:17|
|Last Modified:||20 Apr 2009 09:17|
|Publisher:||Verlag J C B Mohr|