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The Core as the Set of Eventually Stable Outcomes: A Note

Bhattacharya, A. and Abderrahmane, Z. (2006) The Core as the Set of Eventually Stable Outcomes: A Note. Games and Economic Behaviour, 54 (1). pp. 25-30. ISSN 0899-8256

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Abstract

As a justification of the core as a set of stable social states, Sengupta and Sengupta [1996. A property of the core. Games Econ. Behav. 12, 266–273] show that for any transferable utility (TU) cooperative game with non-empty core, for every imputation outside the core there is an element in the core that indirectly dominates the imputation in a desirable way. In this note we show that this appealing property of the core no longer holds even for the class of hyperplane games, an immediate generalization of TU games into the environments without side payments.

Item Type: Article
Keywords: NTU games; Core; Indirect domination
Academic Units: The University of York > Economics and Related Studies (York)
Depositing User: York RAE Import
Date Deposited: 28 Aug 2009 15:42
Last Modified: 28 Aug 2009 15:42
Published Version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.10.002
Status: Published
Publisher: Elsevier
Identification Number: 10.1016/j.geb.2004.10.002
URI: http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/id/eprint/6156

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