Shimoji, M. (2003) On the equivalence of weak dominance and sequential best response. Games and Economic Behavior, 48 (2). pp. 385-402. ISSN 0899-8256
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Published Version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.09.003
Abstract
In this paper, we identify the conditions under which a strategy is weakly dominated if and only if it is not sequential best response. In addition, we explore the implication for extensive form rationalizability.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Academic Units: | The University of York > Economics and Related Studies (York) |
| Depositing User: | York RAE Import |
| Date Deposited: | 28 May 2009 15:27 |
| Last Modified: | 28 May 2009 15:27 |
| Published Version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.09.003 |
| Status: | Published |
| Publisher: | Elsevier |
| Identification Number: | 10.1016/j.geb.2003.09.003 |
| URI: | http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/id/eprint/6155 |
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