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On the equivalence of weak dominance and sequential best response

Shimoji, M. (2003) On the equivalence of weak dominance and sequential best response. Games and Economic Behavior, 48 (2). pp. 385-402. ISSN 0899-8256

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Abstract

In this paper, we identify the conditions under which a strategy is weakly dominated if and only if it is not sequential best response. In addition, we explore the implication for extensive form rationalizability.

Item Type: Article
Academic Units: The University of York > Economics and Related Studies (York)
Depositing User: York RAE Import
Date Deposited: 28 May 2009 15:27
Last Modified: 28 May 2009 15:27
Published Version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.09.003
Status: Published
Publisher: Elsevier
Identification Number: 10.1016/j.geb.2003.09.003
URI: http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/id/eprint/6155

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