Learning, non-equilibrium beliefs, and non-pecuniary payoffs in an experimental game

Costa-Gomes, M.A. and Zauner, K.G. (2003) Learning, non-equilibrium beliefs, and non-pecuniary payoffs in an experimental game. Economic Theory, 22 (2). pp. 263-288. ISSN 0938-2259

Abstract

Metadata

Authors/Creators:
  • Costa-Gomes, M.A.
  • Zauner, K.G.
Institution: The University of York
Academic Units: The University of York > Economics and Related Studies (York)
Depositing User: York RAE Import
Date Deposited: 05 Jun 2009 13:53
Last Modified: 05 Jun 2009 13:53
Published Version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-002-0295-6
Status: Published
Publisher: Springer Science + Business Media
Identification Number: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-002-0295-6

Share / Export

Statistics