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Truthmakers and modality

Cameron, R.P. (2008) Truthmakers and modality. Synthese, 164 (2). pp. 261-280. ISSN 1573-0964

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Abstract

This paper attempts to locate, within an actualist ontology, truthmakers for modal truths: truths of the form <Possibly, p> or <Necessarily, p>. In section 1 I motivate the demand for substantial truthmakers for modal truths. In section 2 I criticise Armstrong’s account of truthmakers for modal truths. In section 3 I examine essentialism and defend an account of what makes essentialist attributions true, but I argue that this does not solve the problem of modal truth in general. In section 4 I discuss, and dismiss, a theistic account of the source of modal truth proposed by Alexander Pruss. In section 5 I offer a means of (dis)solving the problem.

Item Type: Article
Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: © 2008 Springer. This is an author produced version of a paper published in Synthese. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self archiving policy.
Institution: The University of Leeds
Academic Units: The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts (Leeds) > School of Humanities (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds)
Depositing User: Sherpa Assistant
Date Deposited: 02 Oct 2008 14:03
Last Modified: 08 Feb 2013 17:05
Published Version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9225-2
Status: Published
Publisher: Springer
Identification Number: 10.1007/s11229-007-9225-2
URI: http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/id/eprint/4724

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