Cameron, R.P. (2008) Truthmakers and modality. Synthese, 164 (2). pp. 261-280. ISSN 1573-0964
This paper attempts to locate, within an actualist ontology, truthmakers for modal truths: truths of the form <Possibly, p> or <Necessarily, p>. In section 1 I motivate the demand for substantial truthmakers for modal truths. In section 2 I criticise Armstrong’s account of truthmakers for modal truths. In section 3 I examine essentialism and defend an account of what makes essentialist attributions true, but I argue that this does not solve the problem of modal truth in general. In section 4 I discuss, and dismiss, a theistic account of the source of modal truth proposed by Alexander Pruss. In section 5 I offer a means of (dis)solving the problem.
|Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information:||© 2008 Springer. This is an author produced version of a paper published in Synthese. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self archiving policy.|
|Institution:||The University of Leeds|
|Academic Units:||The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds)|
|Depositing User:||Sherpa Assistant|
|Date Deposited:||02 Oct 2008 14:03|
|Last Modified:||16 Sep 2016 13:37|