Stern, R. (2004) Coherence as a Test for Truth. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXIX (2). pp. 296-326. ISSN 0031-8205
This paper sets out to demonstrate that a contrast can be drawn between coherentism as an account of the structure of justification, and coherentism as a method of inquiry. Whereas the former position aims to offer an answer to the ‘regress of justification’ problem, the latter position claims that coherence plays a vital and indispensable role as a criterion of truth, given the fallibility of cognitive methods such as perception and memory. It is argued that ‘early’ coherentists like Bradley and Blanshard were coherentists of the latter kind, and that this sort of coherentism is not open to certain sorts of standard objection that can be raised against justificatory coherentism.
|Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information:||© 2004 International Phenomenological Society|
|Institution:||The University of Sheffield|
|Academic Units:||The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (Sheffield) > Department of Philosophy (Sheffield)|
|Depositing User:||Sherpa Assistant|
|Date Deposited:||29 Apr 2005|
|Last Modified:||04 Jun 2014 20:13|