White Rose University Consortium logo
University of Leeds logo University of Sheffield logo York University logo

Moral scepticism and agency: Kant and Korsgaard

Stern, R. (2010) Moral scepticism and agency: Kant and Korsgaard. Ratio, 23 (4). pp. 451-474. ISSN 0034-0006

Full text available as:
[img]
Preview
Text
WRRO_43840.pdf

Download (175Kb)

Abstract

One argument put forward by Christine Korsgaard in favour of her constructivist appeal to the nature of agency, is that it does better than moral realism in answering moral scepticism. However, realists have replied by pressing on her the worry raised by H. A. Prichard, that any attempt to answer the moral sceptic only succeeds in basing moral actions in non-moral ends, and so it self-defeating. I spell out these issues in more detail, and suggest that both sides can learn something by seeing how the sceptical problematic arises in Kant. Doing so, I argue, shows how Korsgaard might raise the issue of scepticism against the realist whilst avoiding the Prichardian response.

Item Type: Article
Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: © 2010 Wiley-Blackwell. This is an author produced version of a paper subsequently published in Ratio. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com
Keywords: Christine Korsgaard, Immanuel Kant, moral scepticism, H. A. Prichard, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals
Academic Units: The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (Sheffield) > Department of Philosophy (Sheffield)
Depositing User: Prof Robert Stern
Date Deposited: 11 Apr 2012 09:14
Last Modified: 08 Feb 2013 17:37
Published Version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2010.00478.x
Status: Published
Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell
Refereed: Yes
Identification Number: 10.1111/j.1467-9329.2010.00478.x
URI: http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/id/eprint/43840

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item