Chorlton, K, Hess, S, Jamson, S and Wardman, MR (2012) Deal or no deal: can incentives encourage widespread adoption of intelligent speed adaptation devices? Accident Analysis and Prevention, 48. 73 - 82. ISSN 0001-4575
Given the burden of injury, economic, environmental and social consequences associated with speeding, reducing road traffic speed remains a major priority. Intelligent speed adaptation (ISA) is a promising but controversial new in-vehicle system that provides drivers with support on the speed-control task. In order to model potential system uptake, this paper explores drivers’ preferences for two different types of ISA given a number of alternative fiscal incentives and non-fiscal measures, using a stated preference approach. As would be expected with such a contentious issue, the analysis revealed the presence of significant variations in sensitivities and preferences in the sample. While a non-negligible part of the sample population has such strong opposition to ISA that no reasonable discounts or incentives would lead to them buying or accepting such a system, there is also a large part of the population that, if given the right incentives, would be willing or even keen to equip their vehicle with an ISA device.
|Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information:||(c) 2011,Elsevier. This is an author produced version of a paper accepted for publication in Accident Analysis and Prevention. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy.|
|Keywords:||Latent class; heterogeneity; intelligent speed adaptation; stated preference; incentives|
|Institution:||The University of Leeds|
|Depositing User:||Symplectic Publications|
|Date Deposited:||21 Mar 2012 10:03|
|Last Modified:||16 Sep 2016 17:15|