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Full Information, Well-Being, and Reasonable Desires

Shemmer, Y. (2011) Full Information, Well-Being, and Reasonable Desires. Utilitas, 23 (2). pp. 206-227. ISSN 0953-8208

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Abstract

According to Railton: x is good forme iff my Fully Informed Self (FIS) while contemplating my situation would want me to want x. I offer four interpretations of this view. The first three are inadequate. Their inadequacy rests on the following two facts: (a) my FIS cannot want me to want what would be irrational for me to want, (b) when contemplating what is rational for me to want we must specify a particular way in which I could rationally acquire the recommended desire. As a result, what my FIS could reasonably want me to want is limited by what information my FIS could reliably convey to me. And therefore what my FIS could reasonably want me to want cannot be grounded in changes in desires that my FIS cannot publicly justify. The fourth interpretation limits the scope of what my FIS could want me to want in a way that avoids these problems, but conflicts with standard intuitions about what is a non-moral good.

Item Type: Article
Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: © 2011 Cambridge University Press. This is an author produced version of a paper subsequently published in Utilitas. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy.
Academic Units: The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (Sheffield) > Department of Philosophy (Sheffield)
Depositing User: Miss Anthea Tucker
Date Deposited: 06 Jul 2011 13:06
Last Modified: 08 Feb 2013 17:32
Published Version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0953820811000069
Status: Published
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Identification Number: 10.1017/S0953820811000069
URI: http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/id/eprint/43124

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