Cameron, R.P. (2008) Truthmakers and necessary connections. Synthese, 161 (1). pp. 27-45. ISSN 0039-7857
Available under licence : See the attached licence file.
In this paper I examine the objection to truthmaker theory, forcibly made by David Lewis and endorsed by many, that it violates the Humean denial of necessary connections between distinct existences. In Sect. 1 I present the argument that acceptance of truthmakers commits us to necessary connections. In Sect. 2 I examine Lewis' 'Things-qua-truthmakers' theory which attempts to give truthmakers without such a commitment, and find it wanting. In Sects. 3-5 I discuss various formulations of the denial of necessary connections and argue that each of them is either false or compatible with truthmaker theory. In Sect. 6 I show how the truthmaker theorist can resist the charge that they are committed to necessary exclusions between possible existents. I conclude that there is no good objection to truthmaker theory on the grounds that it violates the Humean dictum.
|Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information:||© 2008 Springer Verlag. This is an author produced version of a paper published in SYNTHESE. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self archiving policy.|
|Keywords:||truthmakers, necessary connections, Lewis|
|Institution:||The University of Leeds|
|Academic Units:||The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts (Leeds) > School of Humanities (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds)
The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds)
|Depositing User:||Repository Administrator York|
|Date Deposited:||08 Apr 2008 16:42|
|Last Modified:||08 Feb 2013 17:05|