Truthmakers and necessary connections

Cameron, R.P. (2008) Truthmakers and necessary connections. Synthese, 161 (1). pp. 27-45. ISSN 0039-7857

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Abstract

In this paper I examine the objection to truthmaker theory, forcibly made by David Lewis and endorsed by many, that it violates the Humean denial of necessary connections between distinct existences. In Sect. 1 I present the argument that acceptance of truthmakers commits us to necessary connections. In Sect. 2 I examine Lewis' 'Things-qua-truthmakers' theory which attempts to give truthmakers without such a commitment, and find it wanting. In Sects. 3-5 I discuss various formulations of the denial of necessary connections and argue that each of them is either false or compatible with truthmaker theory. In Sect. 6 I show how the truthmaker theorist can resist the charge that they are committed to necessary exclusions between possible existents. I conclude that there is no good objection to truthmaker theory on the grounds that it violates the Humean dictum.

Item Type:	Article
Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information:	© 2008 Springer Verlag. This is an author produced version of a paper published in SYNTHESE. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self archiving policy.
Keywords:	truthmakers, necessary connections, Lewis
Academic Units:	The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts (Leeds) > School of Humanities (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds)
Depositing User:	Repository Administrator York
Date Deposited:	08 Apr 2008 16:42
Last Modified:	08 Feb 2013 17:05
Published Version:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9152-7
Status:	Published
Publisher:	Springer
Refereed:	Yes
Identification Number:	10.1007/s11229-006-9152-7
Related URLs:	Organisation/Department
URI:	http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/id/eprint/3729

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