Shalkowski, S. and Bueno, O. (2000) A plea for a modal realist epistemology. Acta Analytica, 15 (24). pp. 175-193. ISSN 1874-6349Full text available as:
Available under License : See the attached licence file.
David Lewis’s genuine modal realism postulates the existence of concrete possible worlds that are spatio-temporally discontinuous with the concrete world we inhabit. How, then, can we have modal knowledge? How can we know that there are possible worlds and how can we know the characters of those worlds?
|Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information:||© 2000 Springer. This is an author produced version of a paper subsequently published in Acta Analytica. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com|
|Academic Units:||The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts (Leeds) > School of Humanities (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds)|
|Depositing User:||Leeds Philosophy Department|
|Date Deposited:||05 Oct 2007 12:18|
|Last Modified:||08 Feb 2013 17:05|
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