Katzav, J. (2004) Dispositions and the principle of least action. Analysis, 64 (283). pp. 206-214.
My aim is to argue for the incompatibility of one of the central principles of physics, namely the principle of least action (PLA), with the increasingly popular view that the world is, ultimately, merely something like a conglomerate of objects and irreducible dispositions. First, I argue that the essentialist implications many suppose this view has are not compatible with the PLA. Second, I argue that, irrespective of whether this view has any essentialist implications, it is not compatible with the kind of explanation that the PLA affords.
|Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information:||© 2004 Blackwell Publishing. This is an author produced version of a paper published in Analysis. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy.|
|Institution:||The University of Leeds|
|Academic Units:||The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds)|
|Depositing User:||Leeds Philosophy Department|
|Date Deposited:||11 Oct 2007 16:08|
|Last Modified:||16 Sep 2016 13:31|