Stern, R. (2007) Peirce, Hegel, and the category of secondness. Inquiry, 50 (2). pp. 123-155. ISSN 1502-3923Full text not available from this repository.
This paper focuses on one of C. S. Peirce's criticisms of G. W. F. Hegel: namely, that Hegel neglected to give sufficient weight to what Peirce calls "Secondness", in a way that put his philosophical system out of touch with reality. The nature of this criticism is explored, together with its relevant philosophical background. It is argued that while the issues Peirce raises go deep, in some respects Hegel's position is closer to his own than he may have realised, whilst in others that criticism can be resisted by the Hegelian.
|Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information:||© 2007 Taylor & Francis.|
|Institution:||The University of Sheffield|
|Academic Units:||The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (Sheffield) > Department of Philosophy (Sheffield)|
|Depositing User:||Repository Officer|
|Date Deposited:||04 Jun 2007|
|Last Modified:||05 Aug 2007 18:49|
|Publisher:||Taylor and Francis|