Clarke, James Alexander orcid.org/0000-0002-9916-9708 (2009) Fichte and Hegel on Recognition. British Journal for the History of Philosophy. pp. 365-385. ISSN 1469-3526
In this paper I provide an interpretation of Hegel’s account of ‘recognition’ (Anerkennung) in the 1802-3 System of Ethical Life as a critique of Fichte’s account of recognition in the 1796-7 Foundations of Natural Right. In the first three sections of the paper I argue that Fichte’s account of recognition in the domain of right is not concerned with recognition as a moral attitude. I then turn, in section four, to a discussion of Hegel’s critique and transformation of Fichte’s conception of recognition. Hegel’s transformation consists, I argue, in the claim that a comprehensive account of recognition in the domain of right must be concerned with recognition as a moral attitude.
|Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information:||This is a preprint of an article submitted for publication in the British Journal for the History of Philosophy, © 2009 British Society for the History of Philosophy.|
|Institution:||The University of York|
|Academic Units:||The University of York > Philosophy (York)|
|Depositing User:||James Clarke|
|Date Deposited:||13 Jun 2007|
|Last Modified:||22 Mar 2016 11:59|